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I. Introduction  
 
A little-noticed concurrence in denial of certiorari by Justice Clarence Thomas may have caused 
a wrinkle in the ongoing net neutrality debate. Late last month, the Supreme Court quietly 
declined to review Lipschultz v. Charter Advanced Services (MN), LLC, an Eighth Circuit 
decision preempting state VoIP regulation.
i
 While concurring in the denial, Justice Thomas 
raised concerns about the underlying theory of federal preemption, noting that “[i]t is doubtful 
that a federal policy – let alone a policy of nonregulation – is” sufficient to support conflict 
preemption.
ii
  
 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence – joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch – casts an interesting shadow on 
the debate over preemption of state net neutrality efforts. Until recently, states have refrained 
from regulating most information services, in part because of the long tradition of treating 
information services as an exclusively federal, and mostly deregulated, domain. But when one 
looks further, it’s clear that Thomas’s primary objection is not a telecommunications law issue, 
but rather an administrative law issue. Thomas noted that because agency policies do not 
themselves determine rights or responsibilities, they are not “final agency action” sufficient to 
support a conflict preemption claim. While he is correct about the federal policy of 
nonregulation, this objection does not preclude the FCC from arguing that laws like California’s 
net neutrality law conflict with the Restoring Internet Freedom (RIF) Order, which is final 
agency action. That said, other language in the concurrence suggests that Thomas may not 
support the specific arguments the FCC is likely to offer to support its theory of conflict 
preemption – which is not a surprise given Thomas’s prior jurisprudence, nor is it necessarily 
fatal to the FCC’s claims. 
 
II. Lipschultz and Preemption of State VoIP Regulation 
 
Charter Advanced Services (MN), LLC v. Lange (later recaptioned as Lipshultz v. Charter) 
involved a challenge to Minnesota’s attempt to regulate fixed, interconnected VoIP service.iii 
Charter Communications offers Spectrum Voice, a service that allows subscribers to make voice 
calls with traditional telephone equipment, but transmits those calls over the Internet rather than 
the traditional public switched telephone network.
iv
 The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission 
compelled Charter to comply with Minnesota state laws governing telephone service. To avoid 
this order, Charter sought a declaratory ruling in federal district court that federal law preempted 
Minnesota law as applied to VoIP service. 
 
The key question for the court was whether, under the Communications Act, fixed VoIP service 
is properly classified as a Title I information service or a Title II telecommunications service. In 
an earlier case, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission v. FCC, the Eighth Circuit upheld the 
FCC’s finding that state regulation of nomadic VoIP service was preempted under either 
classification. If Title II, state regulation was preempted by the inability to separate interstate 
from intrastate traffic (under the “impossibility exception”). And if a Title I service, state 
regulation was preempted by the FCC’s longstanding policy of nonregulation of information 
services.
v
 The Charter case offered a different wrinkle because, unlike nomadic VoIP, Charter’s 
fixed VoIP service apparently could be separated into intrastate and interstate traffic, so the 
impossibility exception did not apply.
vi
 Therefore if fixed VoIP fell under Title II, Minnesota 
would be free to regulate intrastate VoIP traffic. 
 
After reviewing the evidence, the district court found that fixed VoIP was best classified as an 
information service.
vii
 The Eighth Circuit affirmed this finding. Because fixed VoIP was an 
information service, the court found under circuit precedent that the federal policy of 
nonregulation of information services preempted Minnesota law governing fixed VoIP.
viii
 
Minnesota sought Supreme Court review of the classification decision, but the Court denied 
certiorari.
ix
 
 
III. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence and Preemption by Policy 
 
Justice Thomas concurred with the Court’s denial, but he wrote separately to highlight an issue 
not central to the Eighth Circuit’s decision: whether a federal policy of nonregulation could 
preempt state law. Conflict preemption stems from the Supremacy Clause, which states that 
“[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, 
and all Treaties made…shall be the supreme Law of the Land” and requires conflicting state law 
to yield.
x
 As a result, conflict preemption can only occur when state law conflicts with the 
Constitution, a treaty, or a duly enacted Law of the United States.  
 
Thomas noted that “[i]t is doubtful whether a federal policy…is ‘Law’ for purposes of the 
Supremacy Clause.”xi And he is, of course, correct. It is a basic principle of administrative law 
that policy statements, standing alone, do not constitute final agency action because (as Thomas 
notes) they do not represent “the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process” or 
determine a party’s “rights or obligations.”xii Policy statements do not create law, but rather 
“explain[] how an agency will enforce a statute or regulation.”xiii They “are binding on neither 
the public nor the agency, and the agency retains the discretion…to change its position…in any 
specific case.”xiv Because policies have no legal effect, they cannot constitute “laws” and 
therefore the Supremacy Clause does not require state law to yield in the event of a conflict. 
 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence could cast some doubt on the FCC’s traditional dominance over 
regulation of information services. With the exception of certain states’ recent forays into the net 
neutrality battle, most states have generally avoided regulating information services. This 
reluctance has been motivated, at least in part, by the FCC’s consistent refrain, stretching back 
nearly two decades across both Democratic and Republican administrations, that information 
services should “remain insulated from unnecessary and harmful economic regulation at both the 
federal and state levels.”xv Thomas suggests that this policy, which was sufficient to defeat 
Minnesota’s efforts to regulate both nomadic and fixed VoIP, is not enough alone to fend off the 
efforts of states which disagree – a conclusion which is also reflected in the Mozilla court’s 
determination that the federal policy of nonregulation is insufficient to support the RIF Order’s 
express preemption provision.
xvi
 Going forward, according to the Mozilla majority, the FCC 
must say more by way of explanation to support a finding that a particular federal regulation of 
information services preempts inconsistent state efforts. 
 
But despite this doubt, Thomas’s primary concern does not pose an obstacle to the government’s 
efforts to fight state net neutrality initiatives in cases such as United States v. California. In that 
case, the government argues that California’s net neutrality law conflicts with the RIF Order’s 
light-touch regulation of broadband service.
xvii
 Unlike the policy of nonregulation of information 
services, the RIF Order was enacted pursuant to notice and comment procedures. It is a final 
order representing the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process regarding the 
proper regulation of broadband network management practices and carries the force and effect of 
law. As a result, it constitutes a “Law[] of the United States” sufficient to preempt contradictory 
state laws under the Supremacy Clause. 
 
IV. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence and Implied Preemption 
 
Thus, while Justice Thomas’s concurrence has raised concerns about the FCC’s approach to 
information services, it does not preclude the agency from arguing that the RIF Order is 
sufficient to support a conflict preemption claim. But elsewhere in the concurrence, one sees 
indications that Thomas may be skeptical of the government’s most likely theory of conflict 
preemption. 
 
As I have discussed in greater detail in earlier Free State Foundation Perspectives articles,
xviii
 the 
FCC’s strongest preemption argument rests on Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.xix In that 
case, the Court found a state tort law requiring airbags in all automobiles was preempted by a 
Transportation Department regulation that “deliberately provided the manufacturer with a range 
of choices among passive restraint devices” designed to “bring about a mix of different devices 
introduced gradually over time.”xx The agency explained why it adopted a this-far-and-no-further 
rule, and the court found that a more stringent state regulation “would have presented an 
obstacle” to the Transportation Department’s efforts and thus would “frustrate the 
accomplishment of a federal objective.”xxi 
 
Similarly, the RIF Order reflects the FCC’s judgment regarding the appropriate level of 
regulatory scrutiny to impose on broadband networks. The Supreme Court’s Brand X decision 
recognized that the Communications Act is ambiguous about whether broadband is a Title I or 
Title II service.
xxii
 Moreover, the agency has ancillary authority to apply specific rules to Title I 
networks, and to forbear from applying specific Title II requirements.
xxiii
 Thus Congress has 
granted the FCC a broad spectrum of potential rules for governing broadband network 
management practices. The RIF Order chose one spot along that spectrum – enhanced 
transparency requirements coupled with general consumer protection and antitrust law – as the 
optimal regulatory bundle, and explained why it felt greater restrictions (such as net neutrality) 
were likely to harm consumers and innovation.
xxiv
 State laws prohibiting blocking, throttling, 
paid prioritization, and the like – restrictions explicitly repealed by the RIF Order – upset this 
carefully calibrated federal scheme and thus are likely preempted because they frustrate the 
accomplishment of a federal objective. 
 
Thomas’s concurrence hints that he might disapprove of this argument. Even if a federal policy 
does constitute final agency action, he writes, the Supremacy Clause “requires that pre-emptive 
effect be given only to those federal standards and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily 
follow from, the statutory text that was produced through the constitutionally required 
bicameralism and presentment procedures.”xxv He goes on to assert that “[g]iving pre-emptive 
effect to a federal agency policy of nonregulation thus expands the power of both the Executive 
and the Judiciary” by “authorizing the Executive to make ‘Law’ by declining to act” and 
“authorizing the courts to conduct a freewheeling judicial inquiry into the facts of federal 
nonregulation.”xxvi  
 
Taken at face value, the idea that a state cannot preempt by “declining to act” could call the 
FCC’s likely conflict preemption argument into question. The FCC will likely argue that the RIF 
Order acts as both a floor and a ceiling for regulation of broadband network management 
practices. The agency gave good reasons why it adopted the rule that it did and why it declined 
to go further, reasons that were upheld in Mozilla. But Thomas hints that the agency cannot rely 
on its refusal to go further as a way to preempt states that disagree. For Thomas, it may be that 
the RIF Order establishes merely a federal regulatory floor that states are permitted to exceed. 
 
Justice Thomas’s disapproval of Geier-like preemption clams based on frustration of a carefully 
balanced federal objective is perhaps unsurprising. After all, Thomas dissented in Geier.
xxvii
 He 
also concurred in the judgment in a later case, Wyeth v. Levine, that arguably narrowed Geier. 
Wyeth found that FDA drug labeling laws did not preempt states from requiring additional 
warnings.
xxviii
 Although he agreed with the resolution of the case, Thomas declined to join the 
majority, instead concurring in the judgment. He said he was “increasingly skeptical of this 
Court's ‘purposes and objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence” in which “the Court routinely 
invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, 
legislative history, or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within 
the text of federal law.”xxix In other words, Thomas interprets conflict preemption strictly and 
would not apply it in cases where state law merely frustrates a federal objective. 
 
Admittedly, this analysis reads a lot of meaning into a small amount of words. But even if the 
FCC is unable to convince Justice Thomas (and perhaps Justice Gorsuch), all is not lost for the 
agency. Unlike with respect to the preemption-by-policy discussion, the sources Justice Thomas 
cites for his narrow view of preemption are a pair of his own opinions concurring in the 
judgment, neither of which commanded a majority of the Justices – or indeed, a single Justice 
other than himself.
xxx
 Thomas’s potential concerns here likely reflect a unique belief about the 
narrowness of conflict preemption that does not appear to be shared by a majority of his 
colleagues. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence certainly could be read as a shot across the bow of the FCC’s 
intention to keep information services free of state regulation. Going forward, the agency cannot 
simply rely on a federal policy of nonregulation to keep states at bay – if, indeed, it ever could. 
Policies of strategic ambiguity, such as the FCC’s position on VoIP service, are likely to create a 
vacuum that states can step in to fill. Only final agency action, preferably action that expressly 
discusses how state action conflicts with the FCC’s objectives, are sufficient to support a conflict 
preemption claim.  
 
But this objection to preemption by policy has little bearing on the government’s pending action 
against California’s net neutrality law. Unlike the policy of nonregulation, the RIF Order is an 
order adopted via notice and comment that carries the force of law. Thus, courts are free to find 
that state net neutrality efforts are preempted to the extent that they conflict with the RIF Order. 
Thomas’s rhetoric, here and elsewhere, suggest he is unlikely to support the specific theory of 
conflict preemption the FCC is likely to pursue. But in this, for now, Thomas speaks only for 
himself (and perhaps Gorsuch). So, the FCC is not precluded from continuing to defend the RIF 
Order from attempts by states to undermine or overturn this federal rule’s light-touch regulatory 
treatment of broadband. 
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, a Professor at Boston College Law School, is a Member of the Free State 
Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an independent, 
nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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